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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICHARD DEE THOMAS, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, : 
Case No. 920875-CA 
v* : Priority 15 
PETE HAUN, et al., : 
Defendants and : 
Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over this matter is conferred upon this 
Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) , providing for jurisdiction 
in the court of appeals over cases transferred from the Supreme 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
granting the defendant's motion to dismiss Thomas's complaint for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted without 
allowing him the opportunity to amend. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court's decision whether to 
allow an amended complaint is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
££• Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 92-93 (1992) 
(reviewing denial of motion for leave to amend); Debry v. Vallev 
Mortgage Co. . 835 P.2d 1000# 1008-09 (Utah App. 1992) (same). See 
also Eldridge v. Block. 832 F.2d 1132, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(reviewing dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)).1 
DETERMINATIVE OR IMPORTANT PROVISIONS 
Addendum A to this Brief contains the complete text of 
the following provisions: 
Utah R. Evid. 201 
28 U.S.C.S. § 1915(d) (1989) 
42 U.S.C.S. § 1981 (1986) (amended Nov. 21, 1992) 
42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (1986) 
42 U.S.C.S. § 1985(3) (1989) 
42 U.S.C.S. § 1986 (1989) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a final order dated October 28, 
1992 of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, 
the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding, dismissing plaintiff's 
civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Thomas, an inmate of the Utah State Prison, commenced 
this action by filing his complaint on July 30, 1992. R. 2-38. In 
Thomas also apparently challenges the dismissal of his 
complaint on the ground that it was based on an unsigned minute 
entry. This contention is simply factually incorrect and therefore 
is not further addressed in this Brief. A copy of the Order of 
Dismissal signed by the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick and dated 
October 28, 1992 is contained in Addendum C to this Brief. R. 63. 
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addition to naming the Attorney General2, the complaint purported 
to name as parties defendant nine members of the Utah Board of 
Pardons, two employees of the Utah Department of Corrections, and 
a district court judge. However, Thomas served process only upon 
the Attorney General and no other defendant made an appearance in 
the action. R. 43. 
On September 1, 1992, the Attorney General filed a motion 
to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that (1) Thomas's 
allegations were incomprehensible and conclusory and therefore 
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, (2) in 
a representative capacity, the Attorney General was not a "person" 
subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and (3) the complaint did 
not allege any personal participation of the Attorney General in 
any conduct that allegedly caused Thomas to suffer constitutional 
harm and therefore the Attorney General was not liable under § 1983 
in a personal capacity. The motion also sought an award of 
attorney fees under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
R. 44-52. 
On September 9, 1992, Thomas filed an "answer" to and 
motion to strike the Attorney General's motion to dismiss. R. 54. 
One month later, on October 9, 1992, the district court made a 
minute entry granting the motion to dismiss "for the reasons 
2Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
General Graham is automatically substituted for her predecessor R. 
Paul Van Dam to the extent he was sued in his official capacity. 
The caption of Thomas's complaint purports to bring suit against 
Van Dam in both his personal and official capacities. To the 
extent former General Van Dam may be deemed a party, this brief is 
also filed on his behalf. 
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specified in the memorandum in support thereof, " but denying 
attorney fees. R. 59. An order of dismissal was entered on 
October 28, 1992, nearly two months after the motion to dismiss was 
filed. R. 60. On October 30# 1992, Thomas filed his notice of 
appeal. R. 65. 
Statement of Facts 
The allegations of the complaint consist of conclusory 
generalizations with few factual allegations. Paragraph 23 is the 
only portion of the complaint that contains any allegations against 
the Attorney General specifically. It alleges that the Attorney 
General "is in violation of plaintiff's Constitutional Right to 
Credit [for] time served" and that the Attorney General "was aware, 
had knowledge that a conspiracy [to deprive Thomas of his civil 
rights] was about to be committed, and having the power to prevent 
or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglect [sic] or 
refuses to do so." R. 11. Thomas further alleges that he wrote 
letters to the Attorney General, "notifying him of credit time 
[sic] served which he ignored, and also informed him of 
misinformation." R. 12. 
In addition, Thomas appears to complain of various 
alleged procedural due process violations in the conduct of a 
parole rescission proceeding against him in October 1990, R. 5-6; 
and of an alleged conspiracy among members of the Board of Pardons 
to deprive Thomas of equal protection of the law by denying him 
credit for time served. R. 7-8. He appears to collaterally attack 
a habeas corpus proceeding before Judge Sawaya of the Third 
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Judicial District Court. R. 8-10. He appears to again allege the 
denial of credit for time served and procedural due process in 
proceedings before the Board of Pardons in November 1991, R. 10; 
and he alleges that the two named Department of Corrections 
employees denied his "constitutionally protected liberty interest," 
apparently in allegedly refusing to "procure Board of Pardons 
hearing to receive credit for time served." R. 13. 
Thomas's claims are brought under federal civil rights 
provisions 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981# 1983, 1985(3) and 1986. The 
complaint does not purport to state any state law claims. 
In a previous action in federal district court, Thomas 
filed a civil rights complaint against the same defendants, based 
upon the same operative facts. The court dismissed that complaint 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) for lack of any arguable merit. Addenda 
D, E, F and G. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
dismissing Thomas's complaint for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted without granting Thomas leave to amend. 
Thomas was on notice of the deficiencies in his complaint and had 
more than ample opportunity to amend his complaint before the 
dismissal was entered. In addition, this was at least the second 
attempt of Thomas to frame a cognizable claim for the violation of 
his federal civil rights, his previous federal action having been 
dismissed for lack of any arguable merit. In any event, Thomas's 
claims related to the conduct of hearings by the Board of Pardons, 
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in which Thomas has no federal constitutional rights and over which 
the Utah Attorney General has no authority or control. Thus, he 
could not possibly state a valid claim for the violation of his 
federal civil rights against the Utah Attorney General and his 
complaint was therefore properly dismissed. The order of dismissal 
below should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THOMAS'S 
COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 
Thomas appears to contend that the trial court abused its 
discretion in dismissing Thomas's complaint rather than allowing 
him the opportunity to amend.3 Federal courts have held that a 
plaintiff should ordinarily be given leave to amend a complaint to 
correct any deficiencies in pleading. See, e.g. . Branum v. Clark. 
927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991); Eldridae v. Block. 832 F.2d 
1132# 1135-36 (9th Cir. 1987). Where the plaintiff is pro se, the 
opportunity to amend should be given "at least once when a liberal 
3Thomas also claims that the court should have required him to 
provide a more definite statement. A more definite statement 
rather than a dismissal is warranted "[w]here the complaint states 
a claim in general language but is not sufficiently definite in 
certain respects to enable defendant to answer." Liquor Control 
Comm'n v. Athas. 121 Utah 457, 243 P.2d 441, 443 (1952). Thomas's 
complaint here, however, was not sufficiently comprehensible to 
withstand a motion to dismiss; therefore a more definite statement 
was not appropriate. Id. ("We are of the opinion that both motions 
cannot consistently be granted, for it is only when a complaint 
states a claim that a motion under Rule 12 (e) can be properly 
considered. If a complaint does not state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, no responsive pleading is required and any 
further attack upon the pleading is useless.") 
6 
reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim 
might be stated." Branum, 927 F.2d at 705. See also Eldridcre. 832 
F. 2d at 1135-36 (amendment should be allowed "unless it is clear 
that they [the deficiencies] cannot be overcome by amendment"). 
Under the circumstances of this case, however, it was not 
an abuse of discretion simply to dismiss the complaint. The 
Attorney General's motion to dismiss gave Thomas notice of the 
deficiencies in his pleading. In response, Thomas chose to stand 
on his complaint and did not request any additional time to file an 
amended complaint. R. 54. Nearly two months elapsed between the 
time the Attorney General filed the motion to dismiss and the entry 
of the order of dismissal. Under Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Thomas could have amended his complaint as a 
matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading was 
served. However, he made no attempt to do so. 
Moreover, this action was at least the second attempt by 
Thomas to state a valid federal civil rights claim based upon the 
same operative facts. This Court may take judicial notice that 
Thomas previously sued these same defendants and made essentially 
the same allegations against them in Thomas v. Anarerhofer. No. 91-
C-1283S (D. Utah) (see copy of complaint attached to this Brief as 
Addendum G) . See Utah R. Evid. 201; Moore v. Estelle, 526 F.2d 
690, 694 (5th Cir.) (court of appeals may take judicial notice of 
prior actions filed by habeas corpus petitioner even though not 
made part of the record on appeal), cert, denied. 426 U.S. 953 
(1976). Cf. Duhart v. Carlson. 469 F.2d 471, 473 (10th Cir. 1972) 
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(district court could take judicial notice of its own records of 
prior class actions of plaintiffs which were dismissed as 
frivolous), cert, denied. 410 U.S. 958 (1973); Rinowood v. Foreign 
Auto Works. Inc. . 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 (Utah App.) (trial court 
properly took judicial notice of proceedings in prior case for 
purpose of determining res judicata effect), cert, denied. 795 P.2d 
1138 (1990). 
As stated in the Report and Recommendation of the 
magistrate in Thomas's prior action: 
Plaintiff's complaint arises mainly from 
decisions made by the Utah State Board of 
Pardons. He complains of not being provided 
with an attorney at parole eligibility 
hearings. He also complains of allegedly not 
being given credit for time served and that 
the board of pardons failed to follow 
established rules and procedures which 
included failing to follow the sentencing 
matrix applicable to his crime. The plaintiff 
asserts that Department of Corrections 
Caseworkers Andrew Hunt and Vickie Bridwell 
failed to obtain on his behalf a hearing with 
the Board of Pardons and that this violated 
his civil rights. 
Thomas v. Anaerhofer. No. 91-C-1283S (D. Utah), Report and 
Recommendation dated March 9, 1992 at 3 (attached to this Brief as 
Addendum D). In the federal case, as in this case, Thomas sought 
to hold the Utah State Attorney General responsible for the Board 
of Pardons' conduct because "VanDam has failed to respond to his 
[Thomas's] letters.11 I£. at 5. Compare Thomas's Complaint in this 
case ("Plaintiff wrote letters to defendant [Van Dam], notifying 
him of credit time served which he ignored and also informed him of 
8 
misinformation.11 R. 12 (Complaint, 1 23) ).4 
Three months before Thomas filed his complaint in this 
case, the federal district court dismissed Thomas's civil rights 
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) on the ground that his claims 
had no arguable merit. Thomas v. Anaerhofer. No. 91-C-1283S (D. 
Utah)• The dismissal was based on a thorough Report and 
Recommendation (attached as Addendum D) and accompanied by a 
detailed written order (attached as Addendum E) . Thus, when Thomas 
filed his complaint in this case, the deficiencies in his federal 
civil rights claims had been previously explained to him in detail 
by the federal district court. Those deficiencies were not 
corrected in his complaint in this case. The dismissal of Thomas's 
federal case was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals in 
Thomas v. Anaerhofer, No. 92-4072, slip op. (10th Cir. December 8, 
1992), attached as Addendum F to this Brief.5 
In any event, even a liberal reading of Thomas's 
4In the federal case, Thomas omitted R. Paul Van Dam and Peter 
Haun from the caption of the complaint, but included them both in 
the body of the complaint. In addressing Thomas's allegations in 
that case, the federal court considered both Van Dam and Haun named 
defendants. See Thomas v. Anaerhofer. No. 91-C-1283S (D. Utah), 
Report and Recommendation dated March 9, 1992 at 1 (attached to 
this Brief as Addendum D). Thus, the parties in the federal case 
were identical to those named in this case, except that in the 
federal case Thomas also sued two more defendants (David J. 
Angerhofer and Dean Sheffield). 
*Under federal law, the res judicata effect of a dismissal 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) is arguably limited to future 
frivolousness determinations in in forma pauperis proceedings. See 
Denton v. Hernandez. U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1734 (1992) 
(dictum). It is cited here for the purpose of establishing that 
Thomas has been afforded other opportunities to frame cognizable 
claims based on the same incidents referred to in his complaint in 
this case. 
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complaint gives no reason to believe that there is a valid basis 
for a claim against the Attorney General for the violation of 
Thomas's federal civil rights; nor has Thomas offered any such 
reason in his brief on appeal. 
Thomas seems to complain that the Attorney General was in 
some way responsible for the alleged failure of the Board of 
Pardons to grant Thomas credit for time served in determining his 
eligibility for parole and to afford him procedural due process 
protections in parole hearings in accordance with the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 
(Utah 1991) (holding due process protections of Utah Constitution 
apply to Board of Pardons proceedings). 
For at least two reasons, Thomas cannot possibly amend 
his complaint to state a cognizable claim against the Attorney 
General for the violation of his federal civil rights in a parole 
hearing. First, Thomas has no federal due process protection in 
Utah parole proceedings. Dock v. Latimer. 729 F.2d 1287, 1289-92 
(10th Cir.), cert, denied. 469 U.S. 885 (1984); Houtz v. Deland. 
718 F. Supp. 1497, 1502 (D. Utah 1989). This is true despite the 
state constitutional procedural protections recognized by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Foote v. Board of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 
1991) . See Jacobs. Visconsi & Jacobs. Co. v. City of Lawrence. 927 
F.2d 1111, 1116-19 (10th Cir. 1991) (state procedural protections 
do not create federal due process interests unless they place 
substantive limits on discretion of decisionmaker); Campbell v. 
Mercer. 926 F.2d 990, 993 (10th Cir. 1991) (same); West Farms 
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Assocs. v. State Traffic Comm'n, 951 F.2d 469, 472 (2d Cir. 1991) 
("the Due Process Clause does not protect against the deprivation 
of state procedural rights11), cert, denied. U.S. , 112 S. 
Ct. 1671 (1992) . Thus, even if the Attorney General had some role 
in the conduct of Board of Pardons hearings and the resulting 
decisions concerning Thomas's eligibility for parole, Thomas has no 
valid federal civil rights claim against either the Board of 
Pardons or the Attorney General. 
Secondly, to state a valid civil rights claim, Thomas 
must allege affirmative conduct creating a causal link between the 
named defendant and the alleged constitutional violation. See 
Rizzo v. Goode. 423 U.S. 362, 373-78 (1976) (reversing injunction 
against Philadelphia mayor, police commissioner and other city 
officials for alleged civil rights violations arising from series 
of incidents of illegal and unconstitutional mistreatment of 
citizens by city police officers where defendants played no 
affirmative part in depriving members of plaintiff classes of any 
constitutional rights, but merely failed to act in the face of a 
pattern of violations) . Here, however, the Attorney General has no 
authority or control over the conduct of Board of Pardons 
proceedings; nor could the Attorney General voluntarily assume such 
responsibility. See Meade v. Grubbs. 841 F.2d 1512, 1528 (10th 
Cir. 1988) (dismissing state officials, including attorney general, 
from civil rights complaint where "[n]one of these officials has 
any statutory authority over the [allegedly unconstitutional] 
conduct of deputy sheriffs" and the plaintiff did not allege that 
11 
any of them voluntarily assumed such responsibility). Thus# the 
necessary causal nexus between the Attorney General and the alleged 
violations of Thomas's rights by the Board of Pardons does not 
exist. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, this Court should affirm 
the judgment of dismissal below. 
DATED this day of April, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
DEBRA J^/MOORE' 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed ;a true and correct cop/ of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, postage prepaid, this M^-day of 
April, 1993 to the following: 
Richard Dee Thomas 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
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ADDENDUM A 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULE 201 
ARTICLE H. 
JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative 
facts. 
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to 
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determi-
nation by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether re-
quested or not. 
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a 
party and supplied with the necessary information. 
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an 
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the 
tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request 
may be made after judicial notice has been taken. 
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the 
proceeding. 
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall in-
struct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal 
case, the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept 
as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. 
28 U.S.C.S. 1915(d) (1989) 
§ 1915. Proceedings in forma pauperis 
(a) Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, 
prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, 
or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security 
therefor, by a person who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay such 
costs or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature of the 
action, defense or appeal and affiant's belief that he is entitled to redress. 
An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in 
writing that it is not taken in good faith. 
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit in accordance with subsection (a) of this 
section, the court may direct payment by the United States of the expenses 
of (1) printing the record on appeal in any civil or criminal case, if such 
printing is required by the appellate court; (2) preparing a transcript of 
proceedings before a United States magistrate in any civil or criminal case, 
if such transcript is required by the district court, in the case of proceed-
ings conducted under section 636(b) of this title or under section 3401(b) 
of title 18, United States Code; and (3) printing the record on appeal if 
such printing is required by the appellate court, in the case of proceedings 
conducted pursuant to section 636(c) of this title. Such expenses shall be 
paid when authorized by the Director of the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts. 
(c) The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform 
all duties in such cases. Witnesses shall attend as in other cases, and the 
same remedies shall be available as are provided for by law in other cases. 
(d) The court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable 
to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is 
untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. 
(e) Judgment may be rendered for costs at the conclusion of the suit or 
action as in other cases, but the United States shall not be liable for any of 
the costs thus incurred. If the United States has paid the cost of a 
stenographic transcript or printed record for the prevailing party, the same 
shall be taxed in favor of the United States. 
(June 25, 1948, ch 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 954; May 24, 1949, ch 139, § 98, 63 
Stat. 104; Oct. 31, 1951, ch 655, § 51 (b), (c), 65 Stat. 727; Sept. 21, 1959, 
P. L. 86-320, 73 Stat. 590; Oct 10, 1979, P. L. 96-82, § 6, 93 Stat. 645.) 
42 U.S.C.S. 1981 (1986) (AMENDED NOV. 2 1 , 1992) 
§ 1981. Equal rights under the law 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same 
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be 
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white 
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, 
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other. 
(R. S. § 1977.) 
(AMENDED NOV. 21, 1992) 
42 U.S.C.S. 1983 (1986) 
§ 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other 
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of 
Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be 
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. 
(R. S. § 1979; Dec. 29, 1979, P. L. 96-170, § 1, 93 Stat. 1284.) 
42 U.S.C.S. 1985(3) (1989) 
(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges. If two or more persons in any 
State or Territory conspire, or go in disguise on the highway or on the 
premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or 
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the 
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, or for the 
purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State 
or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or 
Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons 
conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is 
lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal 
manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person 
as an elector for President or Vice-President, or as a member of Congress 
of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on 
account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in 
this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be 
done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby 
another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and 
exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party 
so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, 
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the 
conspirators. 
(R. S. § 1980.) 
42 U.S.C.S. 1986 (1989) 
§ 1986. Action for neglect to prevent conspiracy 
Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to 
be done, and mentioned in the preceding section [42 USCS § 1985], are 
about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing 
the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful 
act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal 
representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such 
person by reasonable diligence could have prevented; and such damages 
may be recovered in an action on the case; and any number of persons 
guilty of such wrongful neglect or refusal may be joined as defendants in 
the action, and if the death of any party be caused by any such wrongful 
act and neglect, the legal representatives of the deceased shall have such 
action therefor, and may recover not exceeding five thousand dollars 
damages therein, for the benefit of the widow of the deceased, if there be 
one, and if there be no widow, then for the benefit of the next of kin of the 
deceased. But no action under the provisions of this section shall be 
sustained which is not commenced within one year after the cause of 
action has accrued. 
(R. S. § 1981.) 
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Mftmfon 
PAUIW.BOYDEN 
VICTORIA J. PALACOS 
GARY L WEBSTER 
PAUL W. SHEFFIELD. 
Administrator 
THE STAT! OF UTAH 
BOARD OF PARDONS 
6065 South 300 East 
Sift UK* City. Utah 64107 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OBSOSNa 99913260 
Coneideretion of the Status of. HlfWAET) DEE THOMAS ., Utah State Priaon No. 13260 
The above-entitled matter cam* on for a hearing before tha Utah Slala Board of Pardons on tha. 
198 8 for consideration as: 
19TH day of. DECEMBER 
1. 
Z 
3. 
4 
• ORIGNALHEARNG 5. 
• R£>EARNG 6. 
M
 REDETERMINATION 7. 
TERMINATION OF SENTENCE AND PAROLE 
I SPECIAL ATTENTION OF THE BOARD 
PfESCtSSION 
Aftar tha sletement of 
1L 2)_ 
and good cause appearing, tha Board mada tha following decision:. 
.and tha following witnesses) 
MAY 2 3 , 1989 ^19_ EJ Rescind 
• Parole to baeoma effective 
• Amand parole agreement to add tha following special conditions: 
1. 
parole data. CONTINUE PENDING RECEIPT Or ADDITION 
' INFORMATION 
_, 19 with tha foflowing spaoial conditbns: 
2.. 
3.. 
4. 
Q Rehearing tor. _, 19 for tha following reasons: 
Q Termination of sentence and parole to become effective. 
• Expiration of sentence 
REMARKS: 
., 19 . 
, 1 9 . 
Cnme 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
Struct, Cage No, 
5-LIFE 2-33*0 
Judge 
PALMER 
Expit.Dale 
LIFE 
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING 5-LIFE 2-3340 PALMER LIFE 
ATTFMTPFn ESCAPE 0-5 CS CR80-6S2 LEARY UU 
1. 
*•—.. 
3. 
4._ _ _ 
5 
6. . 
7. 
It is further ordered thai in tha event the above named shall be found guilty of any infraction of rules and regulations of the Utah State 
Prison, any community oorredbns center or other residential facility, or shall fail or refuse to perform duties as assigned or is found 
in violation of any other law of the State of Utah prior to the effective date of this decision, the order may be made null and void. 
By order of the Board of Pardons of the Stale of Utah, I have this data 
signature as Administrator for and on behaf of the Slate of Utah, Board of Pardons. 
DECEMBER 19 198 8 affixed my 
Paul W., Sheffield. Administrate , or 
Art appTcation tor redetermination may be made after one year from the Boa/fa 
prevbus action. Appfcations may be obtained through a case worker. 
twz\ 
MEMBERS 
OENNIS M FUCHS l ° V 5 S ^ F & P A U L w SHEFFIELD 
VICTORIA J RALACIOS ^T^ZZ^y Administrator 
GARY L. WEBSTER ' 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER OF PAROLE 
IN TOE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF RICHARD DEE THOMAS 
UTAH STATE PRISON NO. H O T 
This matter of application for parole, termination of sentence, or expiration of sentence 
havinfi come before the Utah State Board of Pardons in a regularly scheduled hearing on the 9th 
day of September. 1987, and the applicant appearing in person or having waived in writing the 
right to appearance and the Board having heard the case, issues the following order: 
It is hereby ordered that Richard Dee Thomas be paroled from the punishment and sentence 
heretofore imposed upon him/her by a iudge of the Second and Third Judicial District Court in 
and for the County of Davis and Salt Lake for the crime(s) of Aggravated Robbery, 1st degree, 
Expiration Life tops; Aggravated Kidnapping, 1st degree Consecutive, Expiration Life tops; 
Attempted Escape. 3rd degree Consecutive, Expiration Life tops. 
The parole shall not become effective until the 12th day of July, 1988. The applicant 
agrees to the conditions of parole and evidences his agreement by signing the parole 
agreement. The parole agreement or contract shall be administered bv duly authorized agents 
of the Utah State Department of Corrections for the Utah State Board of Pardons. 
It is further ordered that if and in the event the above named applicant shall be guilty 
of anv infractions of the rules and regulations of the Utah State Prison or shall fail or 
refuse to perform duties as assigned bv the Utah State Prison or is found to be in violation 
of anv other law of the State of Utah prior to the effective date of said parole, then this 
Order of Parole is revoked and becomes null and void. 
Dated this 9th day of September, 1987. 
By Order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this 15th dav of September, 
1987, reduced its decision in this matter to writing and hereby affix mv signature as 
Administrator for and on behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
N AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
Plaintiff. - (COMMITMENT) 
vs. I Case No. . 
QJKLSZ Q g ^ ~ T U o w \ r t A V Honorable p^<A/»^l n . ITM/rOS* 
Defendant Date MoWPAAAtorA I f i , !<«?>& 
O The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and. 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted O denied. There being no legal or other reason wbf sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted byJD a jury; Q the court; CXfrfea of guilty; 
D plea of no contest; of the offense of A^rC*"* p l f n Q» * ^ i m i H V r v i
 t felony 
of the aiSQs: degree, Da class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by Qi *$ov\ and the State being represented hy ^i»^\<»\naJ$ {$ now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
O to^ a maximum mandatory term of _ _ _ years and which may be for life; 
CVnot to exceed five years; 
O of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
O of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
O not to exceed years; 
O and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 
O and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
oiuch sentence Is to run concurrently with p , ^ "^MftVCfiLr tftUwT. $l\U?c) 
O such sentence is to run consecutively with 
O upon motion of O State, D Defense. D Court. Countfs)r . are hereby dismissed. % 
r%/Cl«l£A*A«.KK\r ih (r^  fgr^v/g. rx*eA±k WA K V U ^ &>j\\)es) &i*X^ nr4it»UQ J^ 
O Defendant is granted a stay of the above (O prison) sentence and placed on probation In the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of ^ pursuant to the attached condpibns of probation. 
[1/Oefendant Is remanded into thecustooy pi the Sheriff of Salt Lake County Oie^delivery to the Utah State 
Prison. Draper!" Utah. prD for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
yfdjmprjsoned In accordance wliMhis Judgment and Commitment." 
cycommitment s h a l f I s w l r l z ^ X*r*r*< 
DATED this ^ d a y 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page 
0023 
ao  -L of. 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 EAST FIFTH SOUTH, SUITE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111 
532-5444 
Felony—Misdemeanor Divisions 
F.JOHN HILL 
Otctof 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES 
ROBERT VAN SCP/ER 
Channan 
0. GILBERT ATHAY 
iaOOieo 
UONEL FRANKEL 
JIMI MITSUNAGA 
IRENE NIELSEN 
RAY GROUSSMAN 
STEWART HANSON. Jr. 
LON HINDE 
JOHN O'CONNELL 
JOSEPH A. GETER 
JOSEPH G. CHENEY. Jr. 
March 8, 1989 
Board of Pardons 
6100 South 300 East 
2nd Ploor 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Re: State v. Richard P. Thomas 
Case No. CR88-1063 
Dear Board Members: 
I represented Richard D. Thomas on the conviction for 
attempted distribution of a controlled substance on November 18, 
1989. I believe it is Important for the Board to realize that Mr. 
Thomas was instrumental in the government's ability to obtain 
convictions on a matter in federal court where pleas were entered as 
a result of Mr. Thomas's availability and willingness to testify as 
a prosecution witness. As a result of that willingness Mr. Thomas's 
present incarceration is no doubt more difficult. 
In addition, this charge was filed six months after it 
occurred and Mr. Thomas was not arraigned in Circuit Court to begin 
the prosecution until fourteen months after the crime occurred. 
Therefore, he served time in prison for a parole violation for the 
same behavior (ie his reinvolvement with drugs.) For all of these 
reasons Mr. Verhoef in the County Attorney's office agreed to 
recommend that Mr. Thomas's sentence here run concurrent with his 
prior case, and that he still be released to a halfway house in May 
of 1989 as was planned before this conviction. The court in 
agreement with this, sentenced Mr. Thomas concurrently and 002,4 
page two 
letter to the Board of Pardons 
Re: Richard D. Thomas 
March 8, 1989 
recommended he receive credit for time served since he returned to 
prison for a parole violation, to hopefully allow him to keep his 
release date and attempt to make amends for the delay in prosecuting 
Mr. Thomas. 
2 hope you will consider these matters in determining an 
equitable release date. 
Si 
DEBRA K. LOY ^ 
Attorney at Law 
DKL/js 
00?5 
Norman H. Bangtrter 
Governor 
H.L(Pete)Haun 
Chairman 
Donald E. Bianchard 
Michael R.Sibbett 
William L Patera 
State of Utah 
BOARD OF PARDONS 
446 East 6400 South. MM 300 
Murray, Utah 64107 
(K1) 261-6*64 October 10,1990 
Richard Thomas, USP# 13260 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Dear Mr. Thomas: 
This is to notify you that you are scheduled for a Rescission Hearing before the 
Utah State Board of Pardons on October 18,1990, at 11:00 a.m. at the Utah State 
Prison. Our records note new conviction. That subject will be the topic of your hearing. 
Sincerely, 
H.L. HAUN, CHAIRMAN/ADMINISTRATOR 
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS 
STA ^tk. 6?< /C^ 4n-f 
Enid O. Pino 
Hearing Officer 
Wt 
cc: Utah Stale Prison 
File 
4136c 
QOZb 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
inrsaii i DECISION 
Consideration of the Status of THOMAS, RICHARD USP No.13260 
The above-entitled natter came before the Board of Par-ions on the 15th day of 
October , 1990 for consideration as: 
1. SPECIAL CONDITIONS 
2. ~ CLASS A 
3. XXX RESCISSION 
4, OTHER 
After hearing the etateaeat of fl.y/,_/ T L , . ^ ^ 
vitness(es) 1) 2) 
an5 the follogins 
tue following decision vas rendered: 
R-*vo!:a _ _ parole date, 
parole date, jt/i Rescind _S.JJJL/^ 
1 / ^ P a r o l a t o be con 2 e f f e c t i v e <>, f 2 2 . t<*oiE » w l t l i t h e f o l l o ^ i n r . s p e c i a l 
c o n d i t T b n s : • 
A.tend p a r o l e a j r e c ^ e n t t o a d d / d e l e t e t h e f o l l o w i n g s p e c i a l c o n d i t i o n s : 
iSJ-
*--—£/*. 
D> Su Ly f „ ^ , iLLJL-i. 
/ P C L/C' f*« 6 / 
^le l tear icg *or 
F. 
Terralnat 5 on of Sentence to become effective^ 
Expiration of Sentence 
Other 
NOTE: This Interim Decision is binding and in full force and effect until 
reviewed by the Board of Pardons members, who will make the final 
determination in tcic natter* In the event the above named shall be founl 
guilty of any infraction of the Rules and Regulations of the Utah State 
Prison, of any Conaunlty Correction Center or of any residential facility or 
is found in violation of any lav of the State of Utah or other good cause, 
this order /nay ba mac's null and void. 
October 18, 1990 
Date 3 . L . HiUM, C h f i i r n n 
0027 
(M 0 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH CTATE T.SCIS !'0. ?f)ri 3 2 30 
Consideration of the Status of THOMAS, RICHARD USE PRISON NO. 13260 
T'.r abovo-encitl?cl itattor ca-ne on for a hearing before the Utah Stat? Bc?r3 oJ 
Fardons on the 30th day of October, 1990, for consideration as: 
A'tir the statement of 
1) 
RESCISSION' -JEERING 
2) 
and the following uitneg"?cs: 
a:.1 »->a-l cius;- <ij)i>?j.r!.n», tie BD.irf tin^ a the follcing ^*c'ston 5j' or jp.r: 
x*:< •'•.£?5.-,' o^ /*»».'3 
ORDER 
r>aro!e lats, 
X'!X Parol" to becoae effective 09/22/1902 with following special coiliti OJS 
LisT> ' -> i - o 1-- sTisian: tf> -•"!! t'r..s following, st>»c*e1 coa!it4on«: 
I. COMPLETE ISP PROGRAM, _ 4. SUBSTANCE ABUSZ THERAPY. 
X: A
 k ^ * *. • ••-.-";\j *rsi^r;s. 
' v» c. 
Re.iearins for 
T,,
..12lLn,l "* « -^nt^nca in*! circle *.o be cone effective 
ZLxpiratiou of sentence effective 
0 : i 2 r 
=11 12 » "»• M •" ^ A C
 1 J'JD?E ' ? I " " T I •>!,• 
1 /.3 3R',VAT~:) ""'>'»B7..;Y 5 ? - i 3 4 0 
2 AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING 5 2 - 3 3 4 0 
3 ~">?,\?2 r.OM r j 3 7 0 r - 7 5 C . - S 0 - 5 P 2 
4 DISTRIBUTING DRUGS FOR VALUE 5 831910631 
PALVER**LIFE 
PALMER**LIFE 
L?/RV 
UOFFAT 11/21/1993 
Ti*3 ••'.acisioi is =uvject t? review ar.d Tio^f.ficatlon by tho r>oard of Far'onr, it 
any tine until actual release from custody. 
Bv ordar of the *?ar^ oT Psrlons of the, 3ta"t>xo ° Utah, I have this ?ste 
30th day of October, 1990, affixed ny signature as Chairman fcr and 
o: behalf r»jr to-? St.'te 3* Vtsh, Tear** of ^trdons. 
H. L. HAUiJ, Chaircan 
0C?S 
Norman EL Bangerter 
Governor 
HX. (Pete) Haun 
Chairman 
Donald E. Blanchard 
Michael R. Sibbett 
William L. Peters 
Heather N.Cooke 
Members 
State of Utah 
BOARD OF PARDONS 
448 East 6400 South - Suite 300 
Murray. Utah 84107 
(801)261-6464 
February 7, 1991 
Richard Thomas USP01326O 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
Dear Mr. Thomas: 
This letter is in response to a letter received by the Board of Pardons on 
February 1, 1991. This letter was addressed to Heather Cook, a Board member. 
Part of my job as a Hearing Officer is to respond to this correspondence. 
Your first concern is the fact that you are housed in maximum security on a 
safety override. This is basically protection. You asked the Board to do 
something about your status at the prison. There is nothing that can be done 
by the Board of Pardons. We do not have jurisdiction over the operation of 
the Utah State Prison or any of its custody decisions. They have a 
classification system which, as I understand it, has administrative 
overrides. Apparently because of your informant activities in the past, you 
have been deemed as needing protection. In any case those questions relative 
to your classification will need to be addressed to the Department of 
Corrections. 
The second question, if I read your letter correctly, is that you would like 
to appear in front of the Board of Pardons to evaluate why you cannot return 
to the community as prescribed. The Board of Pardons had a Rescission hearing 
in October of 1990. They made the decision to rescind your May 26, 1992 
parole date and grant you a new parole date of September 22, 1992. That's 
after an additional four months. The Board has dealt with your case and the 
only mechanism available would be the re-determination process. 
To be quite honest with you, Mr. Thomas, given the fact that you are currently 
under the jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons for Aggravated Robbery, First 
Degree Aggravated Kidnapping, a First Degree Escape from Custody, and Third 
Degree in distributing drugs for value, it is felt that you probably do not 
deserve any special consideration at this point in time. 
Sincerely, 
v^cua St^K 
PAUL LARSEN 
Senior Hearing Officer 
ja or?s 
D O I M I i1 
THIRD CIRCUIT COUK, - SLC 
Defendant Citation: 
Page 1 
MONDAY APRIL 22, 1991 
10:16 AM 
SLP Case: 901001432 FS 
THOMAS, RICHARD DEE State Felony 
Judge: Philip K. Palmer 
Charges 
Violation Date: 07/16/88 
1. THEFT BY DECEPTION 
Plea: 
2. THEFT BY DECEPTION 
Plea: Guilty 
NO CDR | FOR THIS CASE 
76-6-405.3 
Finding/Judgment: Amended 
76-6-405.A 
Finding/Judgment: Guilty Plea 
Proceedings 
01/31/90 Case filed on 01/31/90. 
02/01/90 ARR scheduled for 2/ 2/90 at 
02/02/90 Fel Arr Judge Robin W. Reese 
TAPE: 248 COUNT: 469 
Deft present w/o counsel 
ATD None Present ATP BUD ELLETT 
PRE DSP scheduled for 02/08/90 at 0200 P in room ? with 
LDA Appointed 
02/05/90 FILED APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL LDA: FRANCES M PALACIOS 
FILED FORMAL REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
02/08/90 PALMER/PB T 270 
DEFT PRESENT W/COUNSEL FRANCES PALACIOS 
MARTY VERHOEF PRESENT ON BEHALF OF THE STATE 
ON MOTION OF THE STATE 
C/O CHARGE AMENDED TO CLASS A THEFT BY DECEPTION 
DEFT ADVISED AND WAIVED RIGHTS TO A TRIAL 
DEFT PLEAD GUILTY TO AMENDED CHARGE 
DEFT WAIVED TIME FOR SENT 
SENT: 1 YR JAIL AT UTAH STATE PRISON CONCURRENT 
COMMITMENT SENT TO JAIL 
Entered case disposition of: CLOSED 
CAC 
l LKC 
SSJ 
SSJ 
SSJ 
SSJ 
PKP SSJ 
SSJ 
LMG 
LMG 
PKB 
PKB 
PKB 
PKB 
PKB 
PKB 
PKB 
PKB 
PKB 
GAR 
GAR 
Accounting Summary 
Citation Amount: 
Additional Case Data 
3000.00 
Sentence Summary 
1. 76-6-405.3 
Fine amount: 
Jail: 
Community Service: 
2. 76-6-405.A 
Fine amount: 
Jail: 365 DA 
Community Service: 
Plea: 
Suspended: 
Suspended: 
Find: Amended 
.00 
00 
Plea: Guilty Fir 
Suspended: .00 
Suspended: 365 DA 
ea 
Pf30 
D O C K E T 
THIRD CIRCUIT COUKx - SLC 
Defendant Citation: 
THOMAS, RICHARD DEE 
MONDAY 
SLP Case: 901001432 FS 
State Felony 
Page 
22, 1991 
10:16 AM 
Case Disposition 
Disposition.. CLOSED 
Personal Description 
Sex: M DOB: 03/09/54 
Dr. Lie. No.: 
Scheduled Hearing Summary 
ARRAIGNMENT 
PRELIM CALENDAR CALL 
DATE: 02/08/90 
State: UT Expires: 
on 02/02/90 
on 02/08/90 
0200 P in room 1 with RWR 
0200 P in room ? with PKP 
the docket report for this case. 
0033 
•
cr] 2 0 1991 
r^cs ^ G F- l 
INMATE GRIEVANCE FORM 
THIS FORM REQUIRES THAT BOTH INMATES AND DESIGNATED STAFF (ASSIGNED) SOCIAL SERVICES 
WORKERS / CASE WORKERS, ETRNIC MINORITY RESOURCE 
LIE LTENANTS) THOROUGHLY COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING 
i j J U U . I i - O ^ v ^ t i ^ A 3~Tfct \ 
 /  , I  I I   SPECI.ALISTS (EMRS), CAPTAINS OR °1 "CD^ v 
22 INMATES NAM! >fcy?ft*> USP# £*fo HOUSLNG AREA 
^&\bo^ 
SpccQc nature of grievance (Who, What, When, Where and H o y ? : / ^ n'^^W^^£^^SA^'SH^'/'<:l 
^ / ^ - / 
Identify those contacted regarding your grievance and state what YOU HAVE DONE to resolve the issue. 
/?P V. )X/As^ /_ 7^7 ?A&~ gg^feV^.^LJf 
What is ihe specific remedy you seek? S /fC 
/</- Ax 
INMATE'S SIGNATURE / DATE 
0C32 
<>' 
/} A INMATE GRIEVA N( R FORM 
OCT 0 2 199! 
GF-l 
THIS FORM REQUIRES THAT BOTH INMATES AND DESIGNATED STAFF (ASSIGNED) SOCIAL SERVICES IO-t3-Cl 
WORKERS / CASE WORKERS, ETHNIC MINORITY RESOURCE SPECIALISTS (EMRS), CAPTAINS OR 
LIEUTENANTS) THOROUGHLY COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: AA-lA? 
fa- //?&*& USP# / - IS^OU HOUSING AREA . 
' 
INMATES NAME , 
SECTION 1 - INFORMAL ACTION TohccnmnleiftrthvTnmat, 
Specfe nature of grieyancr^fWhoyWhat, When, Where and How?: / j r r ^ ^ / 7 ^ 
IqA 4>/2 * • ' '' j -
/i?Q/l-£/&/f*i(?rt ^ t ^ ^ ^ / ^ , ^ & A ~A WfL 
%&£. 
Ah tf 
^^^/^^r/^^7 
, / 7 * r y * -=
 Ma J __>_ J. -• , 
Z7$Q/rt^yz>} 
JAfc 
Idcniify those contacted regarding your grievance and state what YOU HAVE DONE to resolve the issue. 
"is £07/$ 
/t-rttUJ r/rtt<. ?«.&./». 
^ / L 7 ^ b .^^^Z^"^/f^^^u/^ae^Ato^ fr> 
What is ihcspecific remedy you s<#k? /fl$/~L. 
SIGNATUREifi 
miL 
LEVEL 1 6RIEVANCE 
STAFF RESPONSE 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
6R1EVANCE NUMBER:. 9 ID 10.0664 
INMATE NAME: RICHARD THOMAS 
INMATE NUMBER:_ USP 13260 
1 sooke to Mr Paul Larsen today. He states that the Board of Pardons 
was In the process of preparing Information for a request of discovery 
requested by uour attorney. David Anoerhofer. made bu a letter from 
him sent in August. While In that process theu received uour letter 
that you eledge has not been responded to. Mr Larsen said theu had to 
complete the process of completing the request for dlscoveru before 
they could begin to process uour request. 
Never the less. Mr. Lersen did address two Issues brought UP In your 
letter. 
1. He wil l forward your request for redetermination to the board. 
Vou wi l l have your answer as to whether the board wil l honor your 
reouest within two weeks from the date of this writing. 
2. if uou wish to have credit for time served from Judge Moffatfs 
court you or your attorney must provide proof of time served to the 
board. 
If there ere any more issues 1n your letter Mr. Larsen wil l address them 
es soon es his time permits. 
LIEUTENANT E.R.TAL8QT/ October 30,1991 
Ckrk 
Supreme Ctfurt 
^ieri* of ptialj 
332^ateC«]rii0l 
<fcdi fladu Cits, |ltaJf B4114 
October , 1991 
Murium JR. JHall 
gRtrtprrtr ©. JCnfa* 
A**«uri* ©jit! 3««tut 
3u»tirt 
CJfrt«tra* |R . Purfymt 
^Ridpul | l . Zintmtnwm 
Jmitr* 
Mr. Richard Dee Thomas 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Dear Mr. Thomas: 
Please find enclosed a copy of the Foote u. Board 
of Pardons opinion of the Utah Supreme Court. The official 
citation to this case is 808 PACIFIC 2nd 734. It is a valid 
Utah Supreme Court opinion. 
The Executive Director of the juc|iCiai conduct 
Commission for the state of Utah is Dean W. Sheffield. His 
office address is 180 South 300 West, Suite 224, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84101. 
I disagree with your conclusion that the Chief 
Justice of the Utah Supreme Court is " in charge of the 
proceedings of the Judicial Conduct Commission.91 Nothing 
could be further from the truth. The Judicial Conduct Commission 
is appointed pursuant to statute (passed by the legislature) 
and the Supreme Court shall review the commission's proceedings. 
(See photo copy of the latter half of Article VIII Section 13 
of the Utah State Constitution) 
You requested a response to your filings with the 
Judicial Conduct Commission. I regret to say I have control 
over the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court only. I can't 
tell the Judicial Conduct Commission how to inn its office. 
The Utah Supreme Court may review the results of the 
Judicial Conduct Commission, but the clerk of the Supreme Court 
cannot tell the commission how to do its business. 
Very t r u l y you^s, 
f
^ULl 
GeoffAl/ J •' - -j 
Clerk 
Enc: 
F 71 Bu'tler 
«f<^5 
LEVEL 11 RESPONSE 
Reference No: 91D-10-0664 
Subject Code:~~ 62 
Location Code: 03 
Month, Day, Year: ll-ZZ-91 
Mi, Richard Dee Thomas: 
I have reviewed your grievance. You allege that Pete Haun 
Paul Larsen of the Board of Pardons are not responding to your 
legitimate questions regarding your term of incarceration. You 
request that Paul Larsen or Pete Haun respond in writing to your 
questions. 
The Department of Cox x i rtions has no authority over the Board c f 
Pardons or its employees, I cannot order either Mr. Larsen or Mr, 
Haun to respond to your questions. Lt. Talbot has, in good faith, 
contacted Mr. Larsen regarding your situation, and his Level 1 
response is self-explanatory. 
Iii : in i i g i i e i ai n ::  s iii s :::i E n i c 'd . • . 
I suggest that if you wish to appeal my disposition you may r?r 
so by following appropriate policy and procedure FDr. 02/03.02 
Appeals Process. 
Billie Casper 
Grievance Coordinator 
C. KIM THOMPSON, DIRECTOR 
INSTITUTIONAL 0£££ATI0NS 
£• 'fe*vr^ky-—f/y^— 
C.Aim Thompson V 
BC/cj 
0745/96 
36 
State of Utah 
BOARD OF PARDONS 
448 East 6400 South • Suite 300 
Murray. Utah 84107 
(801)261-6464 
Decembei 1991 
Mr. Richard Thomas, USP# 13260 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
Dear Hi: > ^  "Thomas: 
This letter is in response to your letter received in November, 1991* The 
Board of Pardons reviewed your letter and made a decision of no change. 
Specifically, the Board asked me to relate to you that you were given 
consideration by the Board of Pardons for your activities described by your 
attorney, Debra Loy. 
Sincerely, 
PAUL LARSEN 
SENIOR HEARING OFFICER 
ja 
Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
ILL. (Pete) Haun 
Chairman 
Donald E. Bianchard 
Michael R.Sibbett 
William L. Peters 
Heather N. Cooke 
Member* 
flf37 
gtate of Utah 
Judicial Conduct Commission 
Westgate Business Center, Suite 224 
180 South 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Phone (801) 521-3911 
1 
Mr. Richard D. Thomas 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
I : 
The Judicial Conduct Commission has dismissed your complaint 
against Judge James Sawaya. 
Your remedy is appelldL v . <nnl In m i nnl w i I li i n I In mi I M I K I mn n I 
the -Commission. 
1 
nrss 
ADDENDUM C 
Third Judicial District 
OCT 2 8 1992 
PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
KIRK M. TORGENSEN (4927) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondents 
6100 South 300 East, Suite 204 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801)-265-5638 
By. CV <E COUfllY mi 
To^rk Deputy Oferk 
\ ) 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 01- UTAH 
RICHARD DEE THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
* ,r 
Defendants. 
Case No. 920904193 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Judge Dennis I Frederick 
This matter having come before the court on Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss, and the court having reviewed the pleadings; 
S ORDERED, that Plaintiff Rights Complaint ,s 
dismissed with prejudice for failure state a claim for which 
relief granted and the other reasons set forth in 
Defendants' Memorandum ii i Support I: their Motion to Dismiss, 
Dated this ^ r < day of October, 199 
FREDERICK 
0PR3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
iereby cer tify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Order of Dismissal was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Richard Dee Thomas 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
M Dated this / / ' T day of October, 1992. 
ffilCt/h e \4UjL4trfl4*4 
orB4 
ADDENDUM D 
FILED IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT. 
MURT. DISTRICT OF U T A H / ^ 
MARrj^E 
MARKUS BUMMER. CLERK 
IK THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE iSIsTRICTKOF <UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
RICHARD DEE THOMAS, 
t 
Plaintifff Case No. 91-C-1283 S 
t 
vs. 
DAVID J. ANGERHOFER, et. al.# REPORT & RECOMMENDATION 
: 
Defendants. 
The plaintiff, Richard Dee Thomas, an inmate at the Utah 
State Prison, has filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against David 
J. Angerhofer, Utah State Prison contract attorney. He has also 
named as defendants? Andrew Hunt and Vickie Bridwell, Department 
of Corrections Caseworkers; Paul Larsen, Enid O. Pino, Board of 
Pardons Hearing Officers; Peter Haun, Board of Pardons Chairman; 
Paul Sheffield, Board of Pardons Administrator; Michael Sibbett, 
Victoria Palacios, Donald Blanchard, Paul Boyden, Heather Cooke, 
Utah Board of Pardons; Dean Sheffield, Judicial Conduct 
Commission Director; Judge James Sawaya, Third Judicial District 
Court of Utah and R. Paul VanDam, Utah State Attorney General. 
The plaintiff states that he has been denied due process in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and subjected to cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The 
plaintiff seeks $ 3,000,000 in compensatory damages. 
The case has been referred to the magistrate judge under 28 
U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B). The issue is whether service of process 
should be allowed or the case dismissed, in whole or in part, 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). This report and recommendation has 
been submitted pursuant to the reference. 
It is unclear from plaintifffs complaint if he is intending 
to name as defendants the State of Utah, the Board of Pardons, 
the Department of Corrections, the State Judicial Conduct 
Commission and the Utah State Attorney General, or if his intent 
is to name the individuals members of these entities. To the 
extent that plaintiff is attempting to sue the state or its 
entities, his suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit 
by plaintiff in federal court against the State of Utah or its 
entities without its consent. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 
663 (1974) ; Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Craifflnggjpnr 327 
U.S. 573, 579 (1946). Consent to suit in federal court has not 
been given in this case. See Richins v. Industrial Construction, 
Inc., 502 F.2d 1051, 1055 (10th Cir. 1974). Furthermore, the 
State of Utah and its entities are not persons under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, and may not be sued under § 1983. See Will v. Michigan 
Dept. of State Police. 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989). The 
plaintiff's complaint against the State of Utah, the Board of 
Pardons, the Department of Corrections and other state entities 
must be dismissed. 
The plaintiff claims that Utah State Prison contract 
attorney David Angerhofer has failed to provide him with adequate 
2 
legal assistance at the state prison. Defendant Angerhofer as a 
contract attorney for the Utah State Prison does not act tinder 
color of state law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Polk 
County v. Dobson. 454 U.S. 312 (1981). As to defendant David 
Angerhofer plaintiff's complaint should therefore be dismissed. 
Plaintiff's complaint arises mainly from decisions made by 
the Utah State Board of Pardons. He complains of not being 
provided with an attorney at parole eligibility hearings. He 
also complains of allegedly not being given credit for time 
served and that the board of pardons failed to follow established 
rules and procedures which included failing to follow the 
sentencing matrix applicable to his crime. The plaintiff asserts 
that Department of Corrections Caseworkers Andrew Hunt and Vickie 
Bridwell failed to obtain on his behalf a hearing with the Board 
of Pardons and that this violated his civil rights. There is no 
constitutional right to a parole eligibility hearing. See 
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional 
Complex. 442 U.S. 1, (1979); Dock v. Latimer, 729 F.2d 1287 (10th 
Cir. 1984). Such a decision is in the discretion of the Board of 
Pardons. The Department of Corrections and the Board of Pardons 
are separate entities. The Department of Corrections has no 
control over the Board of Pardons and cannot force them to 
provide plaintiff with a parole eligibility hearing. Plaintiff's 
complaint against Department of Corrections caseworkers should 
therefore be dismissed. 
As to members of the Utah Board of Pardons, the Chairman and 
3 
the Director, all are absolutely immune from damage liability for 
actions taken in performance of their official duties regarding 
the granting or denying of parole.1 Knoll v. Webster. 838 F.2d 
450, 451 (10th Cir. 1988). The plaintiff's complaint against all 
Board of Pardon members should therefore be dismissed. 
Plaintiff's complaint should also be dismissed as to Dean 
Sheffield, Director of the Judicial Conduct Commission. 
Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Sheffield failed to act on his 
complaint against the Justices of the Utah Supreme Court. Such a 
complaint is not related to plaintiff's civil rights claim as 
there is an insufficient nexus between the complaint and 
defendant Dean Sheffield. Rizzo v. Goode. 423 U.S. 362 (1976). 
Furthermore, the Judicial Conduct Commission does not have 
jurisdiction over the Utah Supreme Court and cannot order them to 
grant plaintiff's state habeas corpus petition. Plaintiff has no 
federal constitutional right to have his complaint to the 
Judicial Conduct Commission act on by anyone. See Linda R«S. v. 
Richard P. and Texas. 410 U.S. 614 (1973). 
As to Third Judicial District Judge James Sawaya the 
plaintiff cannot maintain suit against him for damages under 42 
1
 Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled under the federal 
constitution to be represented by an attorney at parole hearings. 
His assertion is incorrect. The Foote decision specifically states 
that any right to be represented by counsel at parole hearings and 
review of parole hearings by state judges comes from the Utah State 
Constitution and not the Federal Constitution. Foote v. Utah Board 
of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Ut. 1991). Further, the United States 
Supreme Court has made it clear that there is no right to counsel 
at such hearings. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and 
Correctional ComplexP 442 U.S. 1; Baxter v. Palmicriano. 425 U.S. 
308 (1976). 
4 
U.S.C. § 1983 for things done in his judicial capacity. Judge 
Sawaya is entitled to absolute immunity for his judicial 
activities. Stump v. Soarkman. 435 U.S. 349, 355-57 (1978). The 
judge is entitled to immunity even if he acted maliciously or in 
excess of his authority. Schepp v. Fremont County, Wvo.. 900 
F.2d 1448, 1451 (10th Cir. 1990); Myers v. Garff. 876 F.2d 79# 80 
(10th Cir. 1989). The plaintiffs complaint against Judge Sawaya 
is improper and must be dismissed. 
The plaintiff also complains that Utah Attorney General Paul 
VanDam has failed to respond to his letters. This claim is 
frivolous and does not state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983. The plaintifffs complaint against the Utah Attorney 
General should be dismissed. 
Because the plaintiff has not presented an arguable claim 
against any of the defendants his complaint should be dismissed 
as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). ffeitzke v, Williams. 490 
U.S. 319 (1989). Revnoldson v. Shillincrer, 907 F.2d 124 (10th 
Cir. 1990). IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. 
Copies of the foregoing report and recommendation are being 
mailed to the parties. They are hereby notified of their right 
to file objections hereto within ten days from the receipt 
hereof. 
DATED this * day of March, 1992. 
Rondld N. Boyce 
United States Magistrate Judge 
5 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I have mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Report and Recommendation to 
Richard Dee Thomas 
P O Box 250 
Draper UT 84020 
c\^k 
this V , day of March, 1992. 
^ • - ^ • • » • - ^ ^ ^ r ^ 
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ADDENDUM E 
trfi-t , 
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRXCT OF__UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
RICHARD DEE THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID J. ANGERHOFER, et al., 
Defendant. 
Case No. 91-C-1283-S 
O R D E R 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff Richard Dee 
Thomas' (1) Objection to the magistrate judge's Report and 
Recommendation (R&R) recommending dismissal of Mr. Thomas' 
complaint, and (2) Motion Requesting Reconsideration for Appoint-
ment of Counsel. Mr. Thomas has requested a hearing in connection 
with these motions. However, because Mr. Thomas' request does not 
satisfy the good cause standard set forth in D. Ut. 202(d) and the 
Court concludes a hearing is not necessary, Mr. Thomas' request for 
a hearing is denied. 
The Court has reviewed Mr. Thomas' objection, the R&R and the 
complaint under the applicable de novo standard, 28 U.S.C. § 
636(b)(1). 
) 
0/ 
Plaintiff complains that Mr. Angerhofer, the contract 
attorney, acted under color of state lav. The magistrate judge 
pointed out that a contract attorney does not act under color of 
state law. Polk County v. Dobson. 454 U.S. 312 (1981). Plaintiff 
correctly asserts that when that contract attorney conspires with 
an official he may be considered as having acted under color of 
law. Tower v. Glover. 467 U.S. 914 (1984). However, in order to 
gain the benefit of that exception, Mr. Thomas must plead a 
conspiracy by alleging "specific facts showing agreement and 
concerted action among defendants". Durre v. Dempsey, 869 F.2d 
543, 545 (10th Cir. 1989). Upon review the Court concludes that 
Mr. Thomas has failed to adequately plead a conspiracy and 
therefore, Mr. Angerhofer must be dismissed as not having acted 
under color of state law. 
Mr. Thomas' challenges the recommendation that Judge Sawaya be 
dismissed. He claims that Judge Sawaya also engaged in the alleged 
conspiracy. The Court finds that allegation to be unsupported by 
the complaint and adopts the R&R as it pertains to Mr. Thomas' 
claim against Judge Sawaya. 
Mr. Thomas contends that he enjoys a federally protected 
expectation of a parole eligibility hearing and right to the 
2 
assistance of counsel at that hearing, despite the case lav cited 
by the magistrate judge in support of the opposite conclusion. R&R 
at 3 and 4. The Court has the reviewed relevant case law and holds 
that the magistrate judge was correct in concluding that there is 
no constitutional right to a parole eligibility hearing or to the 
assistance of counsel at such a hearing. 
Mr. Thomas objects to the R&R, alleging that the magistrate 
judge made assumptions concerning who Mr. Thomas was attempting to 
sue and in what capacity. He alleges he should have an opportunity 
to amend and thereby clarify his complaint. The Court has reviewed 
the R&R in light of Mr. Thomas' concern and concludes that the 
magistrate judge gave plaintiff the benefit of the doubt at every 
turn. See, for example, R&R at 2. Therefore, the issues of 
defendants' ability to be sued in various capacities having been 
resolved, amendment of the complaint is not necessary.1 
The Court has reviewed and considered all other arguments 
raised by Mr. Thomas and concludes that he has not presented an 
arguable claim against any of the named defendants. The Court 
'Plaintiff correctly points out that a party may be stripped of his official representative capacity when he violates clearly established 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Pleasant v. Lovell. 876 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989). He then objects to 
the magistrate judge's recommendation on the basis that "the Magistrate failed to demonstrate that defendants did not violate plaintifTs 
constitutional rights." Mr. Thomas apparently misperceives where the burden of proof lies. It is Mr. Thomas who fails to demonstrate that 
defendants' alleged conduct violated his clearly established constitutional rights. 
3 
adopts the R&R and dismisses plaintiff's complaint as frivolous 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). The Court also affirms the magistrate 
judge's Order denying Mr. Thomas' request for appointment of 
counsel. 
It is so ORDERED. 
DATED this 2#* day of fL^J 19.fi". 
BY THE COURTJ 
DAVID SAM 
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 
4 
ADDENDUM F 
F I L ^ D 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSU n i t e d gfefeg OQUft 3? App»k 
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
DEC 0 8 1992 
RICHARD DEE THOMAS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
DAVID J. ANGERHOFER; ANDREW HUNT; 
VICKIE BRIDWALL; PAUL LARSEN; PETE HAUN; 
MICHAEL R. SIBBETT; VICTORIA J. 
PALACIOS; DONALD BLANCHARD; PAUL 
BOYDEN; JAMES SEWEYE; HEATHER N. COOKE; 
PAUL SHEFFIELD; ENID 0. PINO; DEAN 
SHEFFIELD; PAUL VAN DAM, Attorney 
General, 
ROBERT L. HOECKER 
Clerk 
No. 92-4072 
(D.C. No. 91-CV-1283) 
(D. Utah) 
Defendants-Appellees, ) 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 
Before MOORE and TACHA, Circuit Judges, and SAFFELS,** Senior 
District Judge. 
••Honorable Dale E. Saffels, Senior District Judge, United States 
District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 
has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 
assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 
This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 
not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 
except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 
the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 
36.3. 
34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 
submitted without oral argument. 
Plaintiff, an inmate in the Utah prison system, brought this 
civil rights suit to redress alleged constitutional violations 
arising out of his efforts to obtain release on parole. He now 
appeals from a district court order dismissing the action as 
legally frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). 
The magistrate judge and district court thoroughly analyzed 
the various claims asserted in the complaint, and we concur in the 
court's conclusion that they lack the arguable merit necessary to 
warrant further proceedings. See Neitzke v. Williams. 490 U.S. 
319, 327 (1989); Hall v. Bellmon. 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 
1991). We add the following comments only to clarify two 
interrelated points prompting much of the discussion in 
plaintiff's appellate brief. 
First, plaintiff emphasizes repeatedly that the Utah Supreme 
Court held in Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 
1991), that the state constitution, unlike its federal 
counterpart, grants prisoners due process rights in connection 
with parole proceedings. Id. at 735; cf. Dock v. Latimer. 729 
F.2d 1287, 1289-92 (10th Cir.), cert. denied- 469 U.S. 885 
(1984)(no due process rights enforceable in Utah parole context 
under federal constitutional analysis set out in Greenholtz v. 
Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex. 442 U.S. 1 
(1979)): Houtz v. Deland. 718 F. Supp. 1497, 1502 (D. Utah 
1989) (same result as in Dock after amendment of Utah parole 
provisions). Second, plaintiff asserts that the absolute immunity 
2 
rationale employed by the district court to dismiss the 
constitutional claims asserted against the Board of Pardons 
(Board) and state Judge Sawaya for failure to comply with or 
enforce Foote does not reach the injunctive relief sought against 
these defendants. See Schepp v. Fremont County, 900 F.2d 1448, 
1452 (10th Cir. 1990) (following Pulliam v. Allen. 466 U.S. 522, 
541-42 (1984)). Together these points comprise plaintiff's 
argument for reinstatement of his claims against these state 
defendants. 
While the Foote decision recognizes some level of procedural 
protections in favor of the inmate seeking parole, it does not 
impose any limits on the unfettered discretion vested in the Board 
with respect to its substantive decisionmaking authority. See 
Northern v. Barnes. 825 P.2d 696, 698-99 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
Foote, 808 P.2d at 735. Thus, Foote notwithstanding, plaintiff 
has no federal constitutionally cognizable interest in the Board's 
determination of his parole status. See Jacobs. Visconsi & 
Jacobs. Co. v. City of Lawrence. 927 F.2d 1111, 1116-19 (10th Cir. 
1991)(state procedural protections do not create interests 
implicating due process rights unless they place substantive 
limits on discretionary authority of decisionmaker); Campbell v. 
Mercer. 926 F.2d 990, 993 (10th Cir. 1991)(same); West Farms 
Assocs. v. State Traffic Comm'n. 951 F.2d 469, 472 (2d Cir. 
1991)("the Due Process Clause does not protect against the 
deprivation of state procedural rights"), cert, denied. 112 S. Ct. 
1671 (1992). Plaintiff's claims based on Foote raise at most the 
possible violation of state law, and consequently lack the 
3 
constitutional foundation for a civil rights violation. See 
Oberndorf v. City & County of Denver. 900 F.2d 1434, 1442 (10th 
Cir.), cert, denied. Ill S. Ct. 129 (1990); cf. Brinlee v. Crisp. 
608 F.2d 839, 843 (10th Cir. 1979) (state procedural errors do not 
present federal questions cognizable on habeas corpus), cert, 
denied. 444 U.S. 1047 (1980). Furthermore, these claims 
constitute, in essence, a challenge to the merits of the state 
court decision approving the procedures followed by the Board in 
plaintiff's case and, as such, seek a species of appellate review 
that is beyond the jurisdiction of the federal district court and 
this court. See Facio v. Jones. 929 F.2d 541, 543 (10th Cir. 
1991); Van Sickle v. Hollowav. 791 F.2d 1431, 1436 (10th Cir. 
1986); Doe v. Pringle. 550 F.2d 596, 599 (10th Cir. 1976), cert, 
denied. 431 U.S. 916 (1977). Consequently, the limited scope of 
defendants' absolute immunity defense does not avail plaintiff, as 
he cannot, even with the aid of the Foote decision, assert an 
arguable claim necessitating invocation of the defense. 
For the reasons set out above, and those expressed by the 
district court, the judgment of the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah is AFFIRMED. Pending motions are denied, 
and the mandate shall issue forthwith. 
Entered for the Court 
John P. Moore 
Circuit Judge 
4 
Saffels, Senior District Judge, concurring. 
I concur in the result reached by the majority based on the 
applicable standard of appellate review for dismissals under 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(d). The Supreme Court has recently noted that a 
§ 1915(d) dismissal is entrusted to the discretion of the court 
entertaining the in forma pauperis petition. See Denton v. 
Hernandez. U.S.
 f 112 S. Ct. 1728# 1734, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 
(1992). On appeal, a § 1915(d) dismissal is to be reviewed for an 
abuse of that discretion. Id. In Neitzke v. Williams. 490 U.S. 
319 (1988), the Supreme Court espoused the standard to be applied 
by the district courts for § 1915(d) dismissals on the basis of 
legal frivolousness. I cannot join the majority in concurring 
with the decision below that none of appellant's claims against 
the 15 named defendants had sufficient legal merit to warrant 
further proceedings. See Olson v. Hart. 965 F.2d 940, 942 n.3, 
943 (10th Cir. 1992)(allegations of complaint held sufficient to 
withstand dismissal under § 1915(d) as legally frivolous); Hall v. 
Bellmon. 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991)(concern that pro se 
litigants have notice and opportunity to avoid dismissal of 
legitimate claims by amending and supporting their pleadings 
militates against equating § 1915(d) standards with those for 
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and Rule 56 summary judgment). 
Nevertheless, I cannot say that the district court abused its 
discretion in dismissing the complaint as legally frivolous. I 
therefore concur in the result reached by the majority. 
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